Ethics After New Materialism: A Modest Undertaking by Reader, John & Evans, Adrian
ethics after
new materialism:
A modest undertaking
John Reader and Adrian Evans
TEMPLE ETHICAL FUTURES

Ethics after New Materialism:
A Modest Undertaking
John Reader and Adrian Evans
Temple Ethical Futures: Issue 2
Shelf Reference: Book 2
Sign up for our free e-newsletter at williamtemplefoundation.org.uk
Follow us on Twitter @WTempleFdn
c©William Temple Foundation 2019

Authors
John Reader is an Anglican Parish Priest currently serving in a multi parish
benefice of 8 churches in the Diocese of Oxford. He is also an Associate Research
Fellow and Trustee of the William Temple Foundation and an Honorary Senior Lec-
turer with the Institute of Education, University of Worcester. Recent publications
include A Philosophy of Christian Materialism co-authored with Tom James and
Chris Baker (2015) and Theology and New Materialism (Palgrave Macmillan 2017).
He has degrees from Oxford, Manchester and Bangor and combines parish ministry
with work in public theology and contemporary philosophy.
Adrian Evans is a Senior Research Fellow in Food, Water and Resilient Commu-
nities at the Centre for Agroecology, Water and Resilience at Coventry University.
Adrian’s research is inspired by the urgent need to develop and promote types of
farming and food consumption that are sustainable, just and resilient and that pay
due care and attention to the needs of humans, animals and the natural environment–
and he has worked on several European projects relating to issues around food, farm-
ing, animal welfare and water consumption. He was a member of the management
team of the EU project Dialrel, which addressed religious slaughter issues and the
consumption of halal and kosher foods. He also worked as a social-scientific re-
searcher for the Welfare Quality R© project, an EU-funded project which addressed
issues of farm animal welfare. Adrian is the lead author of several European Union
reports, journal articles and book chapters relating to issues such as; consumer con-
iii
iv
cerns about farm animal welfare; the public understanding of animal welfare science;
media representations of religious slaughter and the consumption of halal and kosher
foods. His current research areas include; the practical ethics of food and drink con-
sumption, especially in relation to sustainability and farm animal welfare; engaging
citizens around food and farming issues; theories of consumption practices; food and
communities research. Other interests include: historical geography; science and
technology studies; geographies of material-culture; theories of practice.
Contents
Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1 Introduction 3
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Background Ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Modest Ethics 7
2.1 The Ethics of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Deleuze and Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Ethics in the Infosphere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 New Materialism and Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 In defence of Time and Spaces to reflect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3 From Modest Ethics to Modest Religion 23
3.1 Relational Christian Realism and Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4 From Modest Religion to Modest Science 27
4.1 New Materialism and the ethics of knowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.2 Science after New Materialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.3 More-than scientific knowledges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5 A Modest Conclusion 35
v
CONTENTS 1
6 Questions for Reflection 39
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
In Theology and New Materialism (Reader, 2017), John Reader argued that uncritical
theological appropriations of New Materialism needed to be counter-balanced by
what is termed Relational Christian Realism, building particularly upon the work
of the philosophers Bruno Latour and Bernard Stiegler. Particular weaknesses of
such uncritical interpretations are to be found in the areas of transcendence, human
agency and political implementation. In this publication, the discussion is extended
to the sphere of ethics; although much attention will be given to the contributions
of some new materialists and particularly their forerunner in Gilles Deleuze, the
objective is to show how work needs to go beyond this. What will emerge from
the flow of the debate in this publication is that ethics, along with both science and
religion, needs to learn to exercise a degree of modesty. What we mean by this is that
their respective claims to establish truth in some exclusive manner, and therefore at
the cost of an open engagement with other contributions, need to be tempered by the
recognition that no one approach has the monopoly of truth. Some years ago, one of
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us (John Reader) coined the disrespectful phrase ‘string vest theory’ to illustrate the
tension between the structures and institutions through which we operate and the
need for gaps and spaces in which creative thought and activity can flourish (Goodall
and Reader, 1992, p.152). String vests function to provide warmth only by achieving
an optimum balance between string and holes. Too much string and the vital gaps
disappear; but none at all and everything falls apart. The danger with all of our
institutions and indeed our academic disciplines is that they become so dominant
and all-consuming that they begin to make inflated claims for their importance and
significance. The creative spaces get squeezed out and the processes by which we
move forward and develop are so diminished that the life and vitality is frozen out.
In each of the areas to be discussed in this text we will see the need for a certain
modesty: in ethics, in science and indeed in religion.
1.2 Background Ideas
Some of the ideas which support this approach are worth a quick mention. In
the 1990s, when all the talk was of postmodernity and the breakdown of meta-
narratives—in other words, those frameworks which claimed to represent exclusive
truth claims—I proposed that, rather than being grand narratives, or the alterna-
tive of simply local narratives, we should view these frameworks as major narratives
(Reader, 1997, pp.74-8). Hence, still important and of value, but open enough to the
challenge of other frameworks to be able to engage in critical debate. In most areas
of our lives we are prepared to admit that we might be wrong when faced with new
experiences or fresh evidence. Latour talks about truth as the process of keeping
the references circulating, which seems a similar approach. When we prevent the
references from circulating, and stop potential participants contributing to a process
of continued discovery and discernment, that is when dogmatic truth claims emerge
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and the few attempt to impose their interpretations or ‘truths’ upon the rest. Power
takes over. Established frameworks become frozen in aspic and provide only a false
sense of security. A dimension which will play out as this exploration progresses
is that of the performative, or what we have called in the theological world, mate-
rial religious practices. If attention is given to what people actually do rather than
what they say or claim, then it is much easier to identify the process of change and
development in action and to become aware of the differences that shape our lives
on all levels. That is the dimension of practice. But we must also acknowledge
our engagement with the material, which is both ourselves and also the artefacts or
technologies through which we exercise our capacities to order and create. Modesty
in truth claims then, but also modesty in recognising the day to day realities of
our lives, the others on whom we depend, whether human or non-human, and the
complexities which we all too often reduce to convenient generalities in order to ma-
nipulate and control. In ethics there is a tendency to construct ethical frameworks
in order to cope with that complexity and produce criteria by which we can evaluate
human action and make decisions about the right way forward, but, as we shall see,
one of the contributions of New Materialism is to challenge this way of working on
the grounds that it oversimplifies the complexity and underestimates the uncertain-
ties and contingencies of our lives. We need to become more comfortable with that
which we cannot control and is constantly moving beyond us. Modesty may demand
that we move more slowly and carefully rather than dashing ahead in ways that our
culture and digital technology encourages us to do. This is a modest undertaking,
then, and asks a certain patience and willingness to explore. To undertake this task,
we have identified five principles and underlying frameworks that bring to the surface
some of the dimensions and impacts associated with modest ethics.

Chapter 2
Modest Ethics
2.1 The Ethics of Information
As an example of how this new modesty might play out in context we examine the
ethics of information. The initial task is to establish links between the material and,
in this case, media and information, and to recognise the ethical dimensions of this
debate. Both areas of concern return us to discussions about technology, as already
pursued in an earlier publication in this series (Reader and Savin-Baden, 2018). The
challenge is to steer between, on the one hand, forms of technological determinism,
and, on the other, the notion that humans are fully in control of and capable of
shaping technologies for their own purposes and use. Neither does justice to the
complexity of the engagements and interactions between humans and technology.
There is a danger of underestimating the extent to which humans are always already
themselves material, embedded and networked creatures, not totally transparent
to ourselves. How and where to locate an accurate description of human agency
remains an open question to be examined in detail in specific instances. As John
Durham Peters says, things can be alive, and people can be machines (Peters, 2016,
7
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p.89). He quotes Saint Augustine: ‘We however, who enjoy and use other things, are
things ourselves’. Any philosophy of media needs to acknowledge that the barriers
between subject and object, between the human and the non-human are porous and
negotiable, and an understanding of this is essential when one comes to consider the
ethical implications of new developments in this area. Media are already material,
but then so are the humans employing them, who are themselves subject to the
influences of all forms of communication. The question is whether this now demands
a different conceptuality given this understanding and the new challenges evident,
particularly with digital technology. Perhaps an ‘ethics’ derived in part from New
Materialism might be a valuable contribution to this debate. As we register our
awareness of other ethical frameworks it will become clear that they no longer meet
the requirements of a new and appropriate conceptuality.
An important intervention in the field of information ethics is that of Luciano Floridi
and a brief examination of his work will illustrate both how he draws upon more tra-
ditional ethical frameworks and also how he begins to move beyond them (Floridi,
2010). He begins by comparing information ethics to environmental ethics (itself of
interest given the trajectory of this series on Ethical Futures and the parallel concern
with environmental matters). The latter, he argues, grounds its analysis upon the
intrinsic worthiness of life and the intrinsically negative value of suffering (Floridi,
2010, p.111). From this biocentric approach he wants to extend these principles to
all forms of existence and replace biocentrism with what he calls ‘ontocentrism’. So
‘being’ is more fundamental than life, and entropy (or randomness) more so than
suffering. The existence and flourishing of all entities and their global environment
on the one hand, and entropy as destruction, corruption, pollution and depletion of
informational objects on the other hand, should be the guidelines of this ontocen-
trism. Being/information has an intrinsic value, and any informational entity has a
right to persist, and indeed a right to flourish, in its own state. Floridi writes:
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As a consequence of such ‘rights’, information ethics evaluates the
duty of any moral agent in terms of contribution to the growth of the
infosphere and any process, action or event that negatively affects the
whole infosphere—not just an informational entity—as an increase in its
level of entropy and hence an instance of evil (Floridi, 2010, pp.112-13).
Not only is such an approach rights based, but it also requires an impartial and
universal interpretation which he calls an ontological equality principle (Floridi, 2010,
p.113), so any form of reality, by virtue of existing, should be acknowledged as having
the right to exist and flourish. The application of this could be achieved whenever
actions are impartial, universal and ‘caring’. Floridi also employs the concept of the
social contract in this context, although this would have to be expanded beyond its
more normal anthropocentric interpretation.
Perhaps most significantly, Floridi argues that both bioethics and environmental
ethics fail to achieve a level of complete impartiality as they are still biased against
what is inanimate, lifeless and intangible, whereas information ethics breaks through
this barrier and lowers the condition for the attribution of ethical value with the
result that all entities, as being informational objects, have an intrinsic moral value,
although possibly quite minimal and overridable, and therefore count as moral pa-
tients, subject to some equally minimal degree of moral respect understood as a
disinterested, appreciative and careful attention (Floridi, 2010, p.116). As some will
realise, this comes close to a deep ecology approach, which may seem quite surprising
from a more analytically oriented thinker such as Floridi.
We have presented his approach at some length as it is really important to recog-
nise how far this goes towards a radical understanding of ethics. For those familiar
with current philosophical movements it may seem adjacent to the Object Oriented
Ontology associated with Harman and Bryant, although it does not enter into the
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complexity of this position in any detail. The question, however, is whether what is
basically a Kantian, rights-based, social contract approach goes far enough in achiev-
ing Floridi’s objective of attributing moral value to entities which are non-human
and indeed inanimate. We note that there are some neo-Kantian approaches that
extend concern to other animate beings. But Floridi is pushing the boundaries be-
yond what may be convincing and runs the risk of building a radically new approach
on an understanding of human agency which is still too individualistic. It is also
essentially a rationalist approach which assumes that humans are detached from and
thereby capable of exercising universal and impartial moral judgements on what is
simply a greater range of entities than hitherto acknowledged. One of the classic
critiques of a Kantian approach is that it is unable to establish motives for right
action. Why be moral at all? What needs to be argued is that Floridi’s objectives
are more appropriately achieved by an ethics developed through and beyond New
Materialism, building specifically upon the work of Deleuze. So, it is to this that we
now turn.
2.2 Deleuze and Ethics
Since so many of the New Materialist theorists draw upon Deleuze it would not
make sense to begin to present their thought without at least some reference to his
work (see Baker, James and Reader, 2015, pp.37-40). Here, we will once again build
upon an interpretation of Deleuze’s work by the feminist New Materialist philoso-
pher Rosi Braidotti (Braidotti, 2012, pp.170-97). For those not familiar with this
work, it requires a mental shift which is challenging in its own right. We are not
about to encounter yet another ethical framework in competition with utilitarianism,
deontological ethics, virtue ethics, or even a Habermasian communicative ethics, be-
cause what Deleuze sets out to describe does not fit these categories. The problem
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with this is that it tends to be dismissed as ethical relativism or even a refusal to
engage with this sort of analysis. Yet Braidotti claims that Deleuze’s engagement
with ethics is at the heart of his philosophy (Braidotti, 2012, p.170). In contrast
to a Derridean or Levinasian approach to ethics, which focuses upon the relation-
ship between the subject and the other—the unconditional demand of the other in
terms of proximity and hospitality which may often lead to vulnerability and sacri-
fice—Deleuze proposes an affirmative and positive understanding based on a notion
of becoming. This is an active, relational ontology in which otherness is approached
as the expression of a productive limit or generative threshold which calls for an
always already compromised set of negotiations. In other words, there is no escape
from the messy, confused and complex web of relationships and assemblages which
constitute the creative chaos that is life as lived experience. Unlike Floridi’s Kantian
approach, which assumes a self-regulating and rational moral subject or individual
struggling with how to implement an existing set of values, this digs down to the
ever-changing and developing interrelationships among human beings as well as be-
tween humans and non-humans. There is no overarching or transcendent position
from which one might evaluate situations and reach a justifiable ethical decision, but
rather the constant embedding in the midst of contexts where human autonomy is
already proscribed and limited, both in terms of relationships with others and with
the non-human other. Thus, it should be possible to acknowledge the ways in which,
for instance, media and information as encountered in digital technology are always
already both shaped by and shaping the relationships which are a matter of concern.
The concept of a moral individual or subject is brought into question and replaced
by an interest in the affects, or impacts, and indeed the effects of truth and power
that such a subject’s actions are likely to have upon the world. As Braidotti says:
This is a kind of ethical pragmatism, which defines ethics as the prac-
tice that cultivates affirmative modes of relation, active forces, and values.
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It is also conceptually linked to the notion of embodied materialism and
to a non-unitary vision of the subject (Braidotti, 2012, p.173).
Hence, ethics is a discourse about forces, desires and values that act as empowering
modes of becoming whereas morality is the implementation of established protocols
and sets of rules. Somewhat like both Nietzsche and Spinoza, Deleuze views ex-
isting moral frameworks as representing essentially negative and resentful emotions
characteristic of life-denying creative passions. Life, vitality, movement and change
emerging as affect and creativity are the life-enhancing approach which Deleuze aims
to promote as an ethics for good, although always acknowledging that change in it-
self is neither good nor evil. Immanence rather than transcendence, and engagement
with context rather than predetermined structures is the way to move towards life-
enhancing actions and events. All of this is to be seen as action in the context of
the assemblages, gatherings and collectives—both human and non-human—which
constitute the sphere within which ethics is to operate. Ethics means faithfulness to
the desire to become, but what is to become is not predetermined or even evaluated
in advance. One’s engagement is empirically embodied and embedded because it is
inter-relational and collective (Braidotti, 2012, p.179).
It is difficult to offer more than a taste of this approach, but the foregoing summary
gives some sense of what is distinctive and interesting about a Deleuzian position.
It is certainly very different from more familiar and traditional ethical frameworks,
even the more recent ones deriving from Derrida and Habermas. As one begins to
question elements of this, it will become clearer how New Materialist versions of ethics
(acknowledging the inevitable plurality of these) relate powerfully to Deleuze, both
providing a more dynamic and creative conceptuality appropriate for the subjects
under discussion, but also limiting possibilities in terms of making decisions in the
public sphere. A Philosophy of Christian Materialism, for instance, drew upon the
work of Alain Badiou to suggest that, when decisions have to be made, a different
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sort of dynamic is called for (Baker, James and Reader, 2015). The challenge then
is to balance what appears to be a form of decisionism with the open and more
fluid approached associated with New Materialism. If this is about human subjects
making lone decisions at key moments, then it would appear to exclude the activity of
agents (human and non-human) acting in concert as part of embedded assemblages
in response to ongoing shifting contexts. There is a need for both the relational
aspect (proximity) and what theologians would call the apophatic (distance).
2.3 Ethics in the Infosphere
Before moving into direct discussion of the potential contribution of an New Ma-
terialist ethics we need to identify specific issues raised by what Floridi calls ‘the
infosphere’ in order to evaluate existing ethical responses. In a longer text looking
at the so-called 4th Revolution, he highlights key aspects of this new reality (Floridi,
2014). He argues that ICTs (Information Communication Technologies) are as much
modifying our world as creating new realities and promoting an informational in-
terpretation of every aspect of our world and our lives in it (Floridi, 2014, p.43).
The online digital world is spilling over into the offline analogue world and merging
with it. The Internet of Things, Ambient Intelligence and web-augmented things
are encroaching ever more deeply (Reader and Savin-Baden, 2018). Floridi says we
are increasingly living ‘onlife’ (Floridi, 2014, p.43). The distinction between online
and offline will eventually disappear altogether. For successive generations this is
already the reality. This is the infosphere in which life is increasingly synchronised,
delocalised and correlated (Floridi, 2014, p.48). An obvious political and ethical
problem this raises is that of the digital divide, which could quickly become a chasm
and lead to what he calls ‘informational slums’ (Floridi, 2014, p.49). The infosphere
could become synonymous with reality itself. In addition, there will be less emphasis
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upon the physical nature of objects and processes which means that a right of usage
becomes at least as important as the right to ownership. Floridi calls this virtual
materialism (Floridi, 2014, p.50). (Note, however, that this is not to be confused
with Deleuze’s very different use of ‘virtual’). In terms of information, though, it
poses the issue of how much of this is a public good rather than an individual posses-
sion. Software is acknowledged to be a (digital) good, even though intangible. But
where and how are the lines to be drawn in this new context?
Further issues that must be registered in passing are those of identity and how in-
fluential ICTs are becoming in shaping individual identities as well as our social
selves and relationships with others. ‘Onlife’ experience does not respect bound-
aries between different online and offline environments, so there might need to be
more spaces or affordances where self-expression and self-construction can take place
(Floridi, 2014, p.73). All of this brings its own dangers, as we are becoming acutely
aware. Privacy, agency, political democracy and how this is to be mediated are ad-
ditional issues that arise in the infosphere and require some sort of ethical response.
Whether Floridi’s rights-based and individualistic, rationalist ethical framework is
adequate to address these is a serious question. Beyond this is the challenge of the
environmental impacts of the infosphere which tend to be neglected but are indeed
significant. Floridi acknowledges that we are taking a gamble by increasing our use of
ICTs with their associated environmental damage in the hope that these will enable
advances in technology that can avert the worst consequences of ecological damage.
But time may not be on our side. Thus, there is a raft of immediate social, political,
environmental and individual concerns raised by the infosphere for which Floridi’s
only response is to appeal to an ethical framework which dates from a totally dif-
ferent era. What New Materialism and Relational Christian Realism offer is a new
conceptuality to form the basis of an appropriate and timely ethics.
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2.4 New Materialism and Ethics
As might be gathered from the brief exposition of Deleuze, ethics as such does not
always feature as a major or explicit concern in the writings of the New Materialists
and one must also be wary of categorising what is a diverse collection of thinkers
under one simple heading. In order to offer a further sense of what is to be en-
countered in this field we turn to a series of conversations between Brian Massumi
(translator of Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus) and a number of fellow
academics (Massumi, 2015). In one of these conversations, Massumi lays out in more
detail his understanding of ethics as resulting from a New Materialist approach. He
suggests that moving in an ethical direction is not a matter of attaching positive or
negative values to actions based on some pre-set system of judgement. It is more
about realising a particular potential and seeing how this plays out in terms of its
effects upon the overall situation. He writes:
Ethics in this sense is completely situational. It’s completely prag-
matic. And it happens between people in the social gaps. There is no
intrinsic good or evil (Massumi, 2015, p.11).
Ethics is about how we inhabit uncertainty, together. There is still a distinction
between good and bad although not between good and evil, the good being that
which realises the maximum potential in a situation, the best that can become.
This requires living and acting within the constraints that are inevitably part of our
existence. He contrasts this with a more traditional approach which presupposes
acting according to a priori moral imperatives. What is important is what emerges
from within a specific set of circumstances and the impacts this then has upon
those others with whom one is engaged. Although he does not explicitly extend this
to non-humans this would be something that New Materialism would aim to do.
In Deleuze’s terms this is an acknowledgement of the priority of immanence over
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transcendence as it moves away from the idea that there is some overall, overarching
universalist framework of values against which one can evaluate one’s actions or
motives. Instead, one acts within the assemblages or gatherings of which one is
already a part and hopes that what emerges will realise the potential for good, or
becoming, that might result from this. The main criterion is that the result should be
life-affirming rather than life-denying. Whilst this is indeed creative and potentially
liberating, does it go far enough in addressing the ethical dilemmas one has to face
or provide at least a steer in the face of the sort of challenges evident within the field
of information ethics?
The task now is to briefly examine both the strengths and weaknesses of the New
Materialist approach and to propose how the resources available from within Rela-
tional Christian Realism might supplement and help to construct a trajectory which
moves beyond these limitations. As Reader (2017) has already covered this in some
detail, this will be a summary rather than a full exposition. The first area is that
identified above as the tension between transcendence and immanence. As against
such a stark binary Relational Christian Realism employs the thought of Latour to
argue instead for an understanding of local or mini transcendences (Reader, 2017,
pp.20-30). Rather than dismissing the concept completely, Latour proposes that
there is a plurality of different contexts within which one can legitimately under-
stand that there is something which goes beyond the immediate and the available,
and in terms of which one can begin to interpret and evaluate one’s thoughts and
actions. The issue is how much one claims for such mini or local transcendences.
As long as they are not then turned into a universal or overarching set of criteria
to be applied across all contexts, then it is acceptable to operate with them as a
reference point in one’s ethical dilemmas. This approach enables one to acknowl-
edge and respect difference but without totally abandoning any sense of an appeal
to something beyond oneself. In essence this is a half-way house between relying
2.4 New Materialism and Ethics 17
on a predetermined set of moral values and simply making it up as one goes along.
Context and situation are fully recognised but without allowing them to be the only
determining factors. We suggest that this is a more appropriate basis for a practical
ethics. Once again this is where retaining a dynamic tension between the relational
(proximity) and the apophatic (distance) becomes important.
A second area which is of equal importance is that of agency and what is meant by
that. Reader (2017) looks in detail at various interpretations of this to be found in the
works of Jane Bennett, Levi Bryant, Braidotti and Manuel DeLanda, each of them
important contributors to New Materialism (Reader, 2017, pp.48-61). There are two
crucial issues which require a different and expanded understanding of human agency,
and which can draw heavily upon New Materialism. First is how to acknowledge the
role of non-humans in how things occur and develop in the world, and this clearly
emerges from a concern with environmental issues. Humans are always already
fully embedded in the assemblages, gatherings and collectives which are the effective
means by which change occurs, either for good or bad. Whether we are talking
about technology or indeed what we describe as nature, humans do not function as
lone individuals distinct and separate from what is around and beyond them. The
relevant term from New Materialism in this context is that of distributed agency. The
question of what that means in any particular situation has to be left to examination,
but it better describes the ways in which humans function in practice. Second is
to address the question of human autonomy, and this discourse of assemblages and
distributed agency again presents a more appropriate interpretation of the constraints
and limits within which humans operate. There is a difference between agents and
subjects, and this alternative understanding moves the debates beyond the binary
between subject and object which presupposes that humans are always the subjects
in control of, and manipulating for their own benefit, either nature or technology
as objects. If agency is indeed distributed within the assemblages of humans and
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non-humans, then we gain a more realistic perspective upon how we function within
that greater whole. This is perhaps the major area where New Materialism has a
conceptual advantage over more traditional interpretations.
A third area is related to this but draws upon some other philosophers and a greater
range of ideas. One of the problems identified with Floridi’s approach is that it is
based too heavily upon the notion that humans operate as rational thinkers and
decision makers and that once the evidence and arguments are presented one can
reasonably expect clear and sensible decisions to follow. This fails to take into ac-
count what might be called the subjective or affective dimensions of what it is to
be human. Reader (2005) drew upon the thought of Derrida and Levinas to ar-
gue for a pre-autonomous level of human functioning. This acknowledges that one
often engages with others in situations before any process of conscious thought or
decision-making has taken place. So, the moment of eye contact with another person
is already in advance of any conscious reaction or response and can easily determine
or shape what happens next. This is not to deny a level of autonomy, but to recognise
that humans are always so much more than what happens at a conscious level. New
Materialist ideas on affect and embodiment would further add to this understanding
and challenge Floridi’s appeal to a reduction of humans to the simply rational. Al-
lied to this are the concepts of metastability and neuroplasticity associated with the
philosophers Gilbert Simondon and Catherine Malabou (see Reader, 2017, pp.72-9).
The issue which these ideas attempt to address is that of the capacity of humans
to change and develop, one which is surely crucial if ethical problems are to re-
ceive alternative responses. If it is the case that human behaviour and responses
are largely predetermined by existing patterns of conduct or adherence to specific
traditional frameworks—ethical, political or religious—then the scope for flexibility
and adaptation is severely limited and hope for the future, either environmental or
technological, is going to be in short supply. Both philosophy and related ideas and
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research from neuroscience can offer a deeper understanding of the human capacity
to alter damaging patterns of behaviour and provide a more positive outlook. How-
ever, this must not be limited to the purely rational and conscious as we have already
seen. Once again, this is an area where New Materialist thinkers have a significant
contribution to make.
2.5 In defence of Time and Spaces to reflect
As argued above ideas from New Materialism certainly assist in moving beyond the
more traditional approaches which now seem inadequate in their overall concep-
tualities to address the ethical questions raised by both environmental and digital
technological challenges. Yet they also have their limits—hence the proposal to sup-
plement them with concepts from other sources, notably Latour and Stiegler. In
summary, those that we would commend from Latour include his suggestion that
truth is a matter of circulating references and that one of the keys to constructing
appropriate responses is to keep feeding into any discussion of ethical or political
dilemmas further ideas, people or agents (to use the New Materialist terminology).
It is when the references stop circulating and someone claims to have reached defini-
tive answers which they then intend to impose upon others that one needs to get
worried. This would represent a return to the universal claims of traditional ethical
or religious frameworks. The alternative is not some form of relativism but a con-
sideration of the plurality of voices that need to be heard and acknowledged in any
serious debate. A further helpful idea is Latour’s suggestion that what we need to
deal with are matters of concern rather than matters of fact (Latour, 2004). The
latter are always in danger of reducing complexity to an evidence-based approach
which cannot recognise that values are always already embedded in such judgements.
The task is to acknowledge those values and bring them to the surface by addressing
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shared matters of concern. What this also requires is that we take time reassem-
bling the various factors and components that go to make up any specific matter of
concern rather than trying to reach quick and easy conclusions that fail to address
the whole range of issues that are normally involved. Take time, stand back, allow
other factors and ideas to enter the debate, and keep working on the issues rather
than pre-empting the discussions with sound bite solutions. It is not always easy to
abide by these proposals and there are times when decisions have to be made with
greater haste, but there is much to commend in Latour’s overall approach.
To summarise Stiegler’s contribution to this discussion is even more challenging, but
more detail is again to be found in Reader (2017), especially Chapter 6. One pair of
concepts that is certainly relevant to this particular debate is the terms ‘otium’ and
‘negotium’ (Stiegler, 2013). Both are derived from the time when Roman soldiers
were allowed time out, or recreation from the normal business of fighting. Otium was
that time out and negotium the carrying on of the conflict. Stiegler suggests that in
order to stand back and take time out to reflect and consider we need to regain those
spaces and opportunities similar to the otium—the danger being that the pace and
rapidity with which we are forced into functioning by digital technology leads to a
pre-empting of critical thought and response (Stiegler, 2013, p.60). He sees religious
practices and artefacts as being conducive to this practice through repetition and
attention to those symbols and images which encourage deeper reflection. Care,
attention and attending to what is possible through the slow work of time, are each
potential antidotes to the instant and exploitative demands thrust upon us moment
by moment by the new technologies. Some of the references that need to be kept
in circulation are therefore the resources of space and places for reflection that both
Stiegler and Latour associate with religious traditions. If the opposite of religion is
neglect, then paying proper attention to the matters of concern is indeed consistent
with a religious approach, although there is a risk that institutional religion can itself
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be too easily drawn into the instant culture of digital technology.
Our understanding of knowledge is another area where Stiegler has some important
ideas. He argues that much of what is now counted as knowledge is actually infor-
mation. We are bombarded with information but without the know-how or wisdom
to fully engage with what is being presented to us. Knowledge requires direct partic-
ipation rather than a simple recording or absorbing of one thing after another, and
this again is an area where religious traditions carry an alternative understanding.
Knowing that is not the same as knowing how or being able to identify in depth with
what one is encountering. In terms of relationships with others, both human and
non-human, this deeper engagement is essential for exercising care and attention.
Once again this is about time, or the lack of it, in our contemporary culture. It
perhaps throws a new perspective on Floridi’s idea of the infosphere in which that
time may become ever more difficult to find and protect.

Chapter 3
From Modest Ethics to Modest
Religion
3.1 Relational Christian Realism and Ethics
A key public theologian who already models the dimensions of a modest ethics as
reflected in Relational Christian Realism is John Atherton who, before he died in
2016, was working with ideas of wellbeing (Atherton, 2018). He was aware that
there are possible links with Relational Christian Realism and that this is not a
matter of presenting an ethical framework in any traditional sense, but rather of
taking advantage of empirical research and examining the actual practices to be
found within a religious context. This is based upon sociological and psychological
research into the idea of subjective wellbeing which reveals that certain key elements
contribute to this. Briefly, these are: emotional wellbeing as positive feelings about
the future combined with a degree of personal resilience; finding meaning in one’s
life; being able to develop strategies for dealing with difficult circumstances and
challenges; the social support provided by family and friends; how each of the above
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can be communicated to younger generations; and then a sense that one’s life is
of value not only to oneself but also to others (Atherton, 2018, p.65). Atherton’s
argument is that it is possible to identify how religious beliefs and practices can also
contribute to each of these areas. This is not presented as a proposal to prove the
existence of God but to suggest that religions can have value in terms of supporting
wellbeing.
The equivalents of the areas above are then: comforting beliefs and the faith and
trust in a better future and the possibility of transformation which support emotional
wellbeing; finding meaning by connecting to a reality beyond oneself; the experience
of rituals and repetition within worship—something that Stiegler also notes as be-
ing of value in creating alternative spaces where one can distance oneself from the
constant and immediate demands of digital technology; regulating lifestyle and be-
haviour which enables one to acquire life skills to cope with difficult circumstances;
churchgoing as providing social support and networking; nurturing young people
through religious engagement with schools and education; and having a philosophy
of life which could well include a vision of the common good. A question might
then be the extent to which digital technology contributes positively, or otherwise,
to each of those categories. Can one see how and under what circumstances informa-
tion technology through the digital is either life enhancing or life denying in terms
of each of those areas? This is not an ethical framework but a means of evaluating
the impact and performance of the digital against certain empirically established
criteria.
We would also want to add to that list a concern for the environment, not in the
narrow sense of circumstances which would simply be of benefit to humans such
that relationships with the non-human are no more than instrumental for human
wellbeing, but rather for the wellbeing of the non-human in its own right. Under what
circumstances does the digital either benefit or harm the wellbeing of the planet and
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all of those with whom we share this fragile earth? This feels like a really important
question to raise and doing so in this way could take us beyond the more traditional
Kantian framework developed by Floridi. Atherton’s work offers some real content
to what could otherwise appear a rather schematic contribution from Relational
Christian Realism. Much of the current use of the digital, even within church circles,
is based on its capacity to provide information, or as a means of communication. If,
with Stiegler, we can agree that knowledge is so much more than either information
or communication but is about participation and active engagement with oneself and
others, then we have the basis for a critique of much contemporary practice in this
field.
One final area where Relational Christian Realism presents a different approach is
what we have referred to as the dynamic, or tension, between proximity and distance.
What we experience with digital technology is generally a lack of space and distance
as everything is instant and immediate and we are tempted to respond unthinkingly
and without due care and attention. Religious traditions still protect that delicate
and vital dynamic which allow for withdrawal, and the capacity to distance oneself
from the immediate. (The ‘right to be forgotten’ is an interesting position in this
respect.) Reader (2017) uses the terms relational and apophatic to describe this.
Latour and New Materialism are strong when it comes to describing the relational,
and this is crucial, but less convincing when it comes to acknowledging that which
escapes description and articulation (the apophatic). This, again, is where religious
traditions still have an advantage in that they can point to that which lies beyond,
even though these might be mini or local transcendences. Spaces for other spaces—or
so-called ’khora’—are another means of articulating this priority.
A further dimension is perhaps an ethics of non-appropriation or allowing others
(human and non-human) to exist for themselves in their own right rather than as
what they might be for us. This takes us back to Floridi’s point about everything
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existing for itself and the need to respect and acknowledge this. Whether and to what
extent this is really possible is a subject for further exploration, but it is certainly
part of the picture for a Relational Christian Realist ethics. There is much more to
be developed and examined in this field, but the contributions of New Materialism
as supplemented by the ideas from Relational Christian Realism form an appropriate
contemporary approach to forming ethical responses to the subjects engaged in this
paper. A final comment refers us back to the work of Derrida where he talks about
‘being eaten’ as meaning being appropriated by others for their own reasons, and
where he suggests that this is an ideal which is often impossible to achieve, in which
case the task is to ensure that one is ‘eaten well’ (Derrida, 1991). As we have little
choice but to engage with the infosphere and digital technologies as described by
Floridi, the challenge is to work out what being eaten well means in practice as we
reassemble each instance in Latourian fashion, but also seek to identify and protect
those spaces (otium) which Stiegler identifies as present in religious practices as well
as elsewhere.
Chapter 4
From Modest Religion to Modest
Science
In the previous sections we have seen that the philosophies of New Materialism (and
the associated authors who complement, expand upon and critique this approach)
can provide alternative theoretical lenses for understanding both the ethics of in-
formation and the ethics of digital techno-cultures. Whilst forming a broad church,
these approaches all embrace modesty as one of their defining characteristics. They
are modest with regards to:
• their rejection of over-arching ethical frameworks and their respect for the
empirical complexities of real-world scenarios
• the amount of power and agency that they ascribe to human rationality
• and their focus on the deep interconnections between ethics and materiality,
leading to a new kind of worldly ethics, which is more-than-human in its scope.
As such, these theories seem particularly well-suited to tackle an era faced with
ecological decline and bearing witness to radical changes in what it means to be hu-
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man (in the wake of the growth of Alternative Intelligences and digitally augmented
bodies).
In this section, we continue our line of argument by contending that the philosophies
of New Materialism (and associated authors) can help us to radically re-think the
nature of science and the ethical characteristics of knowledge making more generally.
4.1 New Materialism and the ethics of knowing
First, whilst traditional representational approaches to knowledge privilege the roles
of abstract cognition (mind over body) and ‘secluded’ knowing (laboratory over field),
a New Materialist approach instead embraces the notion of ‘cognition in the wild’
(Hutchins, 1995) and seeks to interrogate how the material contexts in which and
through which knowledge is produced help to shape and mould what can be known.
For example, authors such as Latour (1993) and Pickering and Cushing (1986) have
shown how the material contexts of knowledge production (including experimental
apparatuses, measuring and monitoring equipment and equipment for storing and
analysing data) can have a dramatic impact upon knowledge outcomes.
Second, whilst traditional representational approaches to knowledge favour rational-
ity, calculation and logical argumentation, to the exclusion of other less-formalised
or formalisable knowledge, a New Materialist approach allows space for us to con-
sider the value and importance of tacit, embodied, pre-conscious, intuitive knowing
(what was referred to as the ‘pre-autonomous’ in a previous section). Indeed, a
New Materialist approach might even contend that the vast majority of human ac-
tion and practice is habitual and pre-conscious, and that being-in-the-world precedes
thinking. In terms of human action, thought, it would seem, is almost always an
afterthought.
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Third, whilst traditional representational approaches to knowledge view knowledge
making, and particularly scientific forms of knowledge making, as ways to ‘represent’
or mirror a relatively fixed external world, New Materialist approaches are more
sensitive to the ways in which techniques, methods and epistemologies of knowledge
production act more like ‘tools’ that simultaneously probe but also intervene with
what they are trying to engage with.
4.2 Science after New Materialism
We believe that New Materialism can open up at least two fruitful avenues of enquiry
for understanding the ethics of science. First, new materialist thinkers highlight
the worldly and material nature of scientific knowing. This in turn allows us to
consider the importance of the multiple socio-material contexts in which and through
which scientific knowledge is produced and circulated—laboratories, field stations,
museums, lecture halls, class rooms etc. and how these contexts help to shape
the types of knowledge that can be produced. Furthermore, it also allows us to
consider the ways in which other non-scientific, but still potentially ‘expert’ forms
of practitioner or ‘lay’ understanding are also thoroughly entwined with their own
contexts; a fact that at once makes them invaluable (think of the farmer with a
lifetime of experience of farming in a specific locale) and hard to replicate through
scientific abstraction alone. This in turn presents scientists with a problem (in that
they cannot adequately represent these types of deeply context-dependent, intuitive
knowledges); and an opportunity—to think about new ways of integrating scientific
understanding with other forms of knowledge making practices.
This novel, worldly, approach to science raises important ethical issues, for if scien-
tific understanding is shaped by material contexts and by scientific tools and equip-
ment, then it is clear that these materials deserve far more scrutiny than they have
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hitherto received within mainstream science. ‘Devices’ such as microscopes or mass-
spectrometers or even standards for assessing and evaluating biodiversity do not
merely present reality as it is but rather they take a certain partial engagement with
a segment of reality and cement and elevate it. This in itself can be very useful, to
extend the analogy drawn at the very beginning of this tract, they provide the string
that gives stability to the vest. However, what is also needed for science to flour-
ish is the gaps between the string—the acknowledgement that our current scientific
concepts are only ‘best approximations’ that can and should be swept away if new
empirical evidence arises. This in itself is not a new contention but just a reassertion
of the notion that science is not just a powerful way of knowing the world but also
a disruptive method for generating complexity and uncertainty.
The connection between ethics, science and materiality becomes even more appar-
ent within the design of new technologies. For, as numerous authors have shown,
technologies are never purely technical in nature but are both shaped by societal
values and in turn ‘configure users’ along certain pathways, some of which are more
ethical than others. Even mundane technologies such as electric doors, or sewage
systems, or door keys embody a set of assumptions and values about the nature
of social life. More complex technologies such as computers or mobile phones or
autonomous vehicles contain a vast ethical cosmology within both their hard and
soft-wares. Consider, for example, how a programmer might plan for different crash
scenarios within the software of an autonomous vehicle—how much ‘weight’ would
be given to the livelihoods of drivers versus passengers versus other vehicles versus
pedestrians when deciding on the ‘least harmful’ outcome. These are hardly techni-
cal issues and yet they are part and parcel of many modern technologies and seem
to be largely exempt from public scrutiny or debate.
Second, new materialist thinkers highlight the character of science as a world-making,
as well as, or perhaps instead of, a world-revealing enterprise. Debates about the
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nature of scientific knowledge making are by no means new and arguments still
endure between realist and constructivist approaches to the philosophy of science.
What New Materialism can offer is a middle path between these two extremes—an
appreciation that the world as we apprehend it is not merely a human construction,
but it is also not simply a passive, unchanging externality that is unaffected by
our attempts to know and interact with it. New Materialist thinkers have coined
the term ‘performative’ as a shorthand for this approach. Crucially, a performative
approach flips the relationship between ontology and epistemology. Within a broadly
realist perspective, ontology (the nature of reality) is pre-eminent and the role of
epistemology is only secondary (its sole goal being to refine our sets of methods
and techniques for unveiling the world as it is). In contrast, within a performative
approach, epistemology and our ways, techniques, practices and apparatuses for
knowing the world, come first, because it is through these that we reveal/make
different ontologies and create different worlds. This in turn opens up a new field of
enquiry—namely the study of the ways in which scientists make the world in their
own image and the kinds of ethics, politics and aesthetics that these forms of world
making entail. This field has been termed ‘onto-politics’ but we believe that it might
equally well be termed onto-ethics.
Two excellent illustrations of the ways in which scientists engage in world making or
onto-political endeavours can be found in Latour’s (1993) analysis of the ‘Pasteur-
ization of France’, and Annemarie Mol’s (2002) analysis of the medical condition
atherosclerosis. In his study of Pasteur, Latour goes to great lengths to argue that
Pasteur’s success owed as much to his skills as a network builder than to his skills
as a laboratory scientist. Pasteur was able to gain support for his research by align-
ing with contemporaneous social, political and economic goals, such as the need to
preserve the success of the French wine industry and the need to maintain a healthy
military force. But perhaps more importantly than this, Latour also shows that pas-
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teurisation can only become widespread as an industrial technique if certain aspects
of the laboratory (equipment, methods, practices, techniques, ways of evaluating
success) are exported into the real world. Thus, for Latour science is more about
building novel networks or assemblages of humans and non-humans, than it is about
discovering truths.
Similarly, Mol’s study of the medical condition atherosclerosis (a disease in which
plaque builds up inside your arteries) provides a seminal account of how different
medical techniques and ways of understanding diseases produce not just different
perspectives on a uniform disease but rather create different (very material and very
real) disease ontologies that then have to be knitted together to develop a more
uniform account. Mol argues that the atherosclerosis physically experienced by pa-
tients; described to doctors; probed by imaging techniques; and ultimately examined
at autopsy are not just different perspectives on the same phenomenon but rather
they are different phenomena. Furthermore, ‘the reality’ of atherosclerosis is almost
endlessly fluid as new advances in technology could change the entire way in which
the disease is treated, imaged and experienced. This type of onto-politics has signif-
icant implications for medical ethics and highlights the potentially all-encompassing
and overwhelming, not just ideological but also socio-material nature of diagnostic
and treatment regimes. Thus, one can see that New Materialists approaches can
open up fertile new grounds for exploring the ethics of science.
4.3 More-than scientific knowledges
To complete this section, we would like to discuss the implications that New Mate-
rialist approaches to science might have with regards to developing more ethically-
focused and ethically-aware knowledge making practices. Much progress has already
been made in both developing new approaches to scientific understanding, which fore-
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ground ethical considerations, and in promoting new interdisciplinary and transdis-
ciplinary forms of knowledge making that integrate scientific approaches with other
forms of understanding (such as lay knowledges, practitioner understandings, indige-
nous beliefs and religious insights). Furthermore, we believe that these developments
are entirely necessary if science is to cope with the complexities of multi-dimensional,
socio-natural issues such as climate change, bio-diversity loss, food security, energy
and water provisioning. Two particularly promising new approaches to (scientific)
knowledge making commensurate with New Materialism, include Michel Callon’s
(2009) notion of ‘hybrid forums’ and Latour’s (2004) notion of a ‘parliament of
things’. Both these approaches propose a new kind of science that is open to the
value of other ways of knowing the world and that appreciates the deeply ethical
character of knowledge making.
In his book Politics of Nature, Latour contends that for too long scientists have
had a monopoly over the representation of nature and instead we need to find other
ways of representing the ‘interests’ of non-humans (Latour, 2004). In particular La-
tour argues that, rather than scientists presenting undisputed facts about a singular
and knowable nature, we should instead have an array of different ‘spokespeople’
all of whom speak with a voice that is partly theirs and partly of the non-human
nature that moves them to speak. This does not mean that we should ignore the
views of scientists concerning non-humans; indeed, in some ways these become even
more important than before. Only that we should listen to a plurality of spokespeo-
ple—scientists, poets, artists, indigenous people, and farmers—and that we should
challenge scientists to speak openly about the complexities and uncertainties within
their work and to bring these uncertainties into the public arena, so that they can
be debated and discussed amongst a much larger assemblage.
Callon takes a similar approach and contends that the current model of a detached
science that secludes itself in laboratories and then exports its findings onto the
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world is no longer sustainable and instead we require new approaches to science in
which scientists work closely with a range of stakeholders and citizens to open up
their endeavours to broader public scrutiny and accountability. Callon coined the
term ‘hybrid forums’ to illustrate these types of heterogeneous groups of scientists,
practitioners, stakeholders and laypeople that sometimes spontaneously emerge and
sometimes are artificially co-opted to discuss often controversial issues, such as the
disposal of radioactive waste, or GM crops or the use of pesticides. Callon contends
that these types of hybrid forums provide a powerful means for ‘bringing science
back into democracy’.
As a final point, it is worth considering what role religious understanding might play
within these types of new arenas of knowledge formation and exchange. We would
contend that whilst there is undoubtedly an important role for religious understand-
ings to play within these new hybrid forums that role cannot be one of a domineering
and dogmatic force but rather one that is multi-faith and part of, and open to, a
broader dialogue—in other words, and as outlined in detail previously, it must be a
modest religion.
Chapter 5
A Modest Conclusion
We are arguing for a modest ethics, linked to a similar modesty in both science and
religion. But one has to be careful with this terminology: a modest claim is still
a claim which itself suggests a degree of force in the argument. Behind this lie a
series of substantive positions as articulated in the text: knowledge as embedded
and material rather than distant and abstract taking into account non-specialist
perspectives, material practices and the insights of other disciplines. A willingness
to acknowledge the other levels at which humans function, those of feelings and
instincts as well as what is normally termed the logical and autonomous, and then
the realisation that one is always already in relationship with the non-human in
shifting and evolving assemblages. Rather than lone individuals exercising a means-
ends rationality we perceive that we operate within a distributed agency and that
can mean that we are as much shaped by the technology we devise as we imagine
the creation is under our complete control. Along with some of the other influences
identified, such as the work of Latour and Stiegler, this can lead to a more modest
ethics drawing on the insights of New Materialism as related to the themes just
identified. Ethics is less about constructing frameworks according to which one can
judge whether or not one is living a good life or taking appropriate actions, than
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being worthy of the events over which one has no or little control. Can we affirm,
enhance and intensify such events through the capacity to affect and be affected? In
order to be of some practical use, however, this requires a capacity to reflect and act,
and not simply to be swept along by events. What does this look like in practice and
does it have advantages over the more traditional, Kantian, rights-based approach
we have also examined.
The UK is at the beginning of rolling out 5G, the next generation of smart technology
which will apparently link machines to machines as well as machines to humans.
Fridges will be able to know when stocks are depleted and re-order without human
intervention. Cities will have so many monitors that cars will be able to know
traffic conditions beyond human sight and adjust accordingly. This may be less
effective out in rural areas, but for city living a new era of interconnectedness and
machine directed interactions will become the norm. This is presented as simply the
next stage in the development of current technologies and enhancing the capacity to
speed up responses and activity. Beyond the obvious concerns about national security
because of the Chinese company being employed to construct these systems, there
are much deeper questions about the values and decisions that are already built into
this process. One notes that the UK’s Committee for Data Ethics and Innovation
has given itself the brief to ask for evidence about on-line targeting and bias, and
presumably 5G technology will emerge as being of great interest in both respects.
We already know that companies such as Google and Facebook use the technology
to track our movements and habits which are then made available to advertisers in
order to be able to target us individually—we become the product rather than us
consuming other products. How will 5G then add to the powers of these companies to
predict, shape and influence our behaviour? Privacy has been sacrificed for the sake
of convenience and speed of response. Exactly which values and biases have already
been built into the technology and of which we will have little or no knowledge or
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understanding? Algorithms beyond our ken will determine what we will be told and
what will remain hidden.
The concern with a traditional, rights-based or even environmental ethical approach
is that both come too late on the scene. They apply certain ethical principles only
after the important decisions have already been made: the targeting and the biases
are already built into the systems being deployed. Trying to identify or even chal-
lenge and change those once they are already functioning is going to be too late.
Governance procedures might limit the scope of these operations, but no more than
that. The difficulty is that of entering the debate at an earlier stage, before the
decisions have been made. We would argue that the understandings of a modest
ethics as above stand a better chance of avoiding the instrumentalist approach of
more traditional ethical frameworks—in other words, the ethics is no more than an
application of ideas to systems that are already in place—and instead engage with
the material energies and movements embedded in the technologies as they are being
developed. This becomes a political as well as an ethical challenge.

Chapter 6
Questions for Reflection
1. Are there ways in which a modest religion might contribute to the task of
engaging issues of digital developments, other than through established ethical
frameworks?
2. In what ways might it be possible for non-experts to become involved in the
very technical areas of digital development? For instance, through ‘hybrid
forums’ or citizens’ councils?
3. Do we have criteria for wellbeing that provide a means of shaping an alternative
future less dominated by commercial interests?
4. Given that so much of the dominance of the digital technology relies upon speed
and immediacy, what is required to sustain the ‘slow work of time’ associated
with a more measured and reflective response?
5. Are there religious resources that can take into account the affective, embod-
ied and material aspects of human becoming, or the metastability of the pre-
autonomous?
6. Could a more modest science in conversation with modest religion produce a
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more effective ethics of the digital and the environmental?
7. In what ways could we prevent knowledge as participation being reduced to
knowledge as information?
Bibliography
Atherton, John, ‘By their Fruits Ye Shall Know Them’ in Theology for Changing
Times: John Atherton and the Future of Public Theology ed. by Christopher R.
Baker and Elaine Graham (London: SCM Press Ltd., 2018)
Baker, Christopher, Thomas A. James and John Reader A Philosophy of Christian
Materialism: Entangled Fidelities and the Common Good (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015)
Braidotti, Rosi, ‘Nomadic Ethics’ in The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze ed. by
Daniel W. Smith and Henry Somers-Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012), pp.170-97
Callon, Michel, Pierre Lascoumes and Yannick Barthe, Acting in an Uncertain World
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2009)
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (London: Continuum, 2008)
Derrida, Jacques, ‘“Eating Well”, or the Calculation of the Subject: An interview
with Jacques Derrida’ in Who Comes After the Subject? ed. by E. Cadava, P. Connor
and J.-L. Nancy (New York; London: Routledge, 1991), pp.96-119
Floridi, Luciano, Information: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2010)
Floridi, Luciano, The 4th Revolution: How the Infosphere is reshaping human reality
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)
41
Goodall, Margaret, and John Reader, ‘Creating Spaces’ in The Earth Beneath ed. by
Ian Ball, Margaret Goodall, Clare Palmer and John Reader (London: SPCK, 1992)
Hutchins, Edwin, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press,
1995)
Latour, Bruno, The Pasteurization of France (Harvard: Harvard University Press,
1993)
Latour, Bruno, ‘Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact to matters
of concern’, Critical Inquiry, 30 (2004), 225-48
Latour, Bruno, Politics of Nature (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2004)
Massumi, Brian, Politics of Affect (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016)
Mol, A., The Body Multiple (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2002)
Peters, John Durham, The Marvellous Clouds: Toward a Philosophy of Elemental
Media (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016)
Pickering, A., and J. T. Cushing, Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History of
Particle Physics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986)
Reader, John, Beyond All Reason: The Limits of Post-modern theology (Vale of
Glamorgan: Aureus Publishing, 1997)
Reader, John, Blurred Encounters: A Reasoned Practice of Faith (Vale of Glamorgan:
Aureus Publishing, 2005)
Reader, John, Theology and New Materialism: Spaces of Faithful Dissent (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017)
Reader, John, and Maggi Savin-Baden, Technology transforming Theology: Digital
Impacts (Temple Ethical Futures, Tract No. 1, 2018)
42
Stiegler, Bernard, What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2013)
Woolgar, Steve, ‘Configuring the User: the case of usability trials’, The Sociological
Review, 38 (1990), 58-99
43

Thank you for reading.
If you enjoyed this e-book please write a review.
Please tell your friends and colleagues about this book.
Temple Tracts are free to download, short accessible e-books
presenting engaging analysis on key debates in religion and public life.
Find out more and download the other books in the series at
williamtemplefoundation.org.uk/temple-tracts
Sign up for our free e-newsletter at williamtemplefoundation.org.uk
Follow us on Twitter @WTempleFdn
c©William Temple Foundation 2019
